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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT MARLAN J. HASLAM 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Is the jury's finding of negligence a finding 
that Defendant told Plaintiff she could safely ski? 
2. Were the defenses of contributory negligence and 
assumption of risk properly presented to the jury? 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
refusing to grant Plaintiff's motion for a new trial? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a medical malpractice action tried to a jury in 
the District Court of Weber County, wherein Plaintiff-
Appellant DaNiece Mikkelsen sought damages for injuries 
sustained from a skiing accident following a total hip 
replacement. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant-Respondent 
Marian J. Haslamf M.D. had been negligent in his post-
operative treatment of her hip arthroplasty, claiming 
negligence in the following particulars: 
1. In failing to properly advise her in the 
limitations that should be placed on her physical 
activity in light of the nature of the prosthetic 
device and its fit in her leg and hip area. 
2. In advising her in the spring of 1979 that she 
could go skiing, when Dr. Haslam knew or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have known that 
such activity could not be safely undertaken by a 
woman whose hip was in the condition that Dr. 
Haslam knew or should have known it to be in at the 
time of the advice. 
3. In improperly advising her that she could go skiing 
without appropriate follow-up examinations 
sufficient to apprise himself of the condition that 
developed as a natural result of the surgery that 
was performed by Dr. Haslam 
4. In failing to perform physical and x-ray 
examinations on a regular basis of the hip and leg 
area where the total hip replacement procedure was 
performed in the months and years following such 
procedure. 
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment based on a jury 
verdict dated December 11, 1986, which found Plaintiff and 
Defendant equally negligent and from an order denying 
Plaintiff's motion for a new trial and/or motion for entry of 
judgment in her favor on the issue of liability dated 
November 7, 1986. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Dr. Marian J. Haslam is a 55-year-old board certified 
orthopedic surgeon, practicing in Ogden, Utah (R. 764). In 
1972 he performed the first total hip arthroplasty in 
northern Utah (R. 771). 
The total hip replacement was originated by Dr. John 
Charnley, an English surgeon who began using prosthetic joint 
implants in 1959 (Deposition of Dr. Harold K. Dunnf taken 8-
16-84, page 24, R. 769). The procedure involves replacing 
the femoral head with a stainless steel prosthesis which is 
secured in the upper femur with methyl methacralate cement. 
A polyethelene plastic cup is then glued in the acetabular 
area following reaming of the bone to obtain an accurate fit 
(R. 773). 
Defendant studied congenital hip dislocations and hip 
arthritis extensively from 1961-1964 (R. 769) . He graduated 
from the University of Utah Medical School in 1957 and, 
following an internship in Seattle and a two year term in the 
Air Force, spent three years training in orthopedic surgery 
at the Orthopedic Hospital in Los Angeles (R. 764) . He was 
trained by Dr. J. Vernon Luckr a nationally prominent hip 
surgeon who was in close contact with Dr. John Charnley and 
his progress with artificial hips (R. 768). 
The Federal Drug Administration prohibited physicians 
from using the methyl methacralate cement in this country for 
almost ten years after its initial use in Europe (R. 769). 
In 1970 the University of Utah was issued permission to begin 
performing the total hip operation (R. 769). Defendant 
joined in arthroplasties performed by Drs. Sherman Coleman 
and Harold Dunn at that facility and returned to Orthopedic 
Hospital in 1970 to be trained in the procedure by Dr. Luck 
(R. 770). 
Defendant was Chief of Surgery at McKay-Dee Hospital in 
Ogden when its new facility was constructed. He designed an 
operating room in the new building to be used for total hip 
surgeries (R. 770). He cultured the air in various locations 
within the room and installed ventilation controls to rotate 
the air 13 to 20 times each hour as a precaution against 
infection (R. 771) . After determining that there was good 
control of the air and bacteria, Defendant performed the 
hospital's first total hip surgery in 1972 (R. 771). 
Plaintiff first contacted Defendant about a total hip 
replacement on January 22, 1973 (R. 777). Plaintiff had been 
born with a congenitally dislocated right hip in 1934 (R. 
509-511). She had been limited in her sports activity, but 
could ride a bicycle and attend dances. She walked with a 
limp (R. 510) . She had been treated non-surgically through 
her youth. At approximately age fourteen she underwent 
surgery by Dr. Louis Peery, who placed a metal plate and 
screws in her upper femur to prevent progressive dislocation 
and to stabilize the bone (R. 512). 
Plaintiff dropped out of school in the eleventh grade 
to avoid the pain associated with climbing the school's 
stairs (R. 513) . She married shortly thereafter and had one 
child, Kathy Meeker (R. 514). She later divorced and married 
Gary Mikkelsen in 1955 (R. 514). 
When Plaintiff contacted Defendant about a total hip 
arthroplasty in 1973, he recommended that she not undergo the 
procedure at that time (R. 518). He suggested that she wait 
to see what was going to take place with the hip procedures 
recently completed because there was a concern that the 
components would wear out (R. 778) . Later observations 
indicated that the two components did not deteriorate after 
being placed in the body (R. 779). 
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Anticipating that Plaintiff might want a total hip 
replacement in the future, Defendant recommended that she 
have the metal removed from her femur to prepare the site for 
surgery. He removed the metal on February 20, 1973 (R. 779). 
Plaintiff next approached Defendant about a total hip 
replacement on February 4, 1974, stating that the pain in her 
hip was increasing (R. 782). Following x-rays and an 
examination, they discussed the total hip replacement and 
decided on surgery (R. 783). 
Since 1972, Defendant has instructed his total hip 
patients that the artificial hip is fine for walking; it is a 
man-made device and will wear out; it can break out, it can 
loosen, and it can be a source of infection because it can be 
a repository for germs. He is sure that he talked with 
Plaintiff about these factors at the time of her decision (R. 
783). Defendant also informed Plaintiff that her femur was 
an unusual size and he would have to order a specially made 
component (R. 783). 
Plaintiff's total hip arthroplasty was performed on 
March 13, 1974 at McKay-Dee Hospital (R. 784). Plaintiff had 
small bones (R. 840) so a femoral component with a smaller 
stem was used (Plaintiff's Exhibit #8, page 9). The 
procedure was successful (R. 785). At trial, Plaintiff made 
no claim that the operation had been improperly performed (R. 
919) . 
Following Plaintiff's discharge, Defendant recommended 
that she undergo an osteotomy of her right tibia to correct 
an angle that would prevent her from placing full weight on 
the hip. Defendant performed that operation on May 8, 197 4 
(R. 785). 
Defendant examined Plaintiff on May 21, 1974; June 3, 
1974; June 14, 1974; June 24, 1974; July 16, 1974; and 
September 17, 1974 (R. 787-788). His office notes state that 
during the September exam Plaintiff had no complaints and 
walked with a barely perceptible limp. Plaintiff was ordered 
to return PRN, meaning if she had any problems (R. 788). 
Defendant testified that in 1974 his follow-up program 
was to take total hip patients through their education and 
crutch walking until they could walk well, teach them what 
type of chairs to avoid, and tell them to be careful of other 
activities like twisting, jumping and running. He told them 
to come back if they had problems (R. 789). 
The trial testimony was conflicting concerning 
Defendant's instructions for post operative activities. 
Defendant testified that he is sure that he talked with 
Plaintiff prior to her surgery, about the limitations to be 
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used with the total hip (R. 819) . He further testified that 
postoperatively you have to tell patients "not only the bad 
things, but you have to give them good encouragement. She 
had a good hip. I said, go and enjoy a good hip. You're 
now pretty much back to normal. Normal means she was pretty 
much like she was. But she was told don't run, don't twist, 
and don't lift, and then if you have trouble, contact me." 
(R. 855). 
Plaintiff testified that prior to surgery she had no 
conversation with Defendant regarding the purpose of the 
total hip and the activities she could be expected to do or 
not do after the operation (R. 521). She testified that she 
expressed no interest and made no inquiry at that time as to 
what limitations she might have (R. 568) . Plaintiff 
maintains that upon her release Defendant told her she had no 
limitations and that she could ski, play tennis and do 
whatever she wanted (R. 525). 
Plaintiff testified that her recovery was "remarkable" 
(R. 520). The years from 1974 - 1980 were the best years of 
her life as far as her physicial condition was concerned (R. 
580). She was totally free of pain (R. 524) . She performed 
exercises to strengthen her leg (R. 523) and testified that 
in early February of 1979, she decided she would take up 
skiing (R. 570). She testified that she called Defendant's 
office in the company of two co-workers from her place of 
employment and asked him if she could ski. She stated that 
Defendant said she could ski, that her left hip would 
probably break before her right, and to go and have a good 
time (R. 529). 
Defendant testified that he never advised Plaintiff 
that her operated hip was stronger than her other hip or 
that she could go skiing (R. 763). 
Defendant was invited to the wedding reception of 
Plaintiff's daughter in 1979. Plaintiff walked without a 
limp at that time and appeared to be in no pain (R. 844). 
Plaintiff introduced witnesses who testified that they 
discussed Plaintiff's skiing with Defendant at the reception 
(R. 533) . Defendant does not recall any conversation dealing 
with Plaintiff's skiing (R. 812). Defendant's wife Patricia 
accompanied him to the event and testified that she recalls 
no discussion of skiing (R. 888). 
Plaintiff skied 10-12 times in 1979 and another 10-12 
times in 1980 (R. 531, 534). On Sunday, March 2, 1980, she 
was skiing with her daughter and son-in-law at Powder 
Mountain, near Ogden (R. 535) . The skies were overcast. 
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Snow had fallen the night before and the runs were partially 
groomed (R. 611, 612). The light was not very good (R« 594) 
and the surface conditions were listed on the Ski Patrol 
Incident Form as heavy powder (Plaintiff's Exhibit 10f 
Appendix 1)• 
Plaintiff saw her friend Ken Herrick and asked him to 
ski with her and give her instruction (R. 536) . Plaintiff 
and Mr* Herrick started down the Drifter run which has 
beginner, intermediate and expert terrain (R. 629). 
Mr- Herrick could not recall whether he was skiing in 
front of Plaintiff or close to her (R. 613). She executed 
numerous turns (R. 614). They were skiing slowly because 
Plaintiff wanted him to give her pointers and he testified 
that "she was executing everything a little bit more 
pronounced than she normally was to get the effect of her 
ski" (R. 616). 
Mr. Herrick testified "at one point, she started to 
fall, and I heard a definite pop and she went down" (R. 614). 
The Ski Patrol Incident Form lists the patient's description 
of the incident as follows: "Making a turn to the right, 
left ski edge caught, went straight downhill, resulting in 
doing the splits, falling to her knees with both skis 
extended" (Plaintiff's Exhibit 10; Appendix 1). Mr. Herrick 
testified that Plaintiff's safety bindings did not release 
during the fall and that he did not run a check on the 
binding settings (R. 632). 
Plaintiff requested that she be flown to St. Benedict's 
Hospital in Ogden because her daughter and son-in-law worked 
there (R. 541) . She asked to be treated by Defendant (R. 
542). A nurse contacted him at home regarding the accident 
(R. 812). 
Defendant had relinquished his privileges at St. 
Benedict's Hospital in 1974 because nearly all of his work 
was being performed at McKay-Dee Hospital (R. 767). He told 
the nurse to tell Plaintiff that he did not have privileges 
at St. Benedict's/ but would arrange for her to transfer by 
ambulance to McKay-Dee (R. 813) . He was anxious and willing 
to help her (R. 814) . 
Plaintiff refused to be transferred (R. 573). She was 
disappointed that Defendant had not come to St. Benedict's 
and could not understand why he would not come to the 
hospital when it contained the facilities necessary to 
operate (R. 890) . 
Dr. Jack Crosland assumed Plaintiff's care. He 
strongly recommended that Plaintiff be treated by Defendant 
and contacted Defendant regarding her refusal to change 
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hospitals (Deposition of Dr. Jack Crosland taken 5-4-82). 
Dr. Haslam authorized Dr. Crosland1s assumption of her care 
(Crosland deposition page 12) . 
Dr. Crosland found Plaintiff's leg broken around the 
femoral component. The acetabular cup was not loose and 
remains intact (Crosland deposition, page 14). Dr. Crosland 
disconnected the joint and removed the femoral prosthesis, 
replacing it with a rod to stabilize the bone (Crosland 
deposition, page 17). The rod was removed 14 months later 
(Dunn deposition, page 9). Plaintiff's present physician, 
Dr. Harold Dunn, has recommended that a new femoral component 
not be inserted because the bone stock is poor (Dunn 
deposition, page 5). Plaintiff accordingly has no hip joint. 
Six orthopedic surgeons testified at trial. The 
following brief excerpts from trial testimony are relevant to 
the issues raised: 
Respondent Marian J. Haslam. Defendant testified as 
to his qualifications, training, experience, and board 
certification. He has stayed current on developments in the 
area of total hip replacements by attending yearly continuing 
education meetings on the subject (R. 766). He represents 
the state of Utah on the board of counselors for the American 
Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons (R. 766). He is also a 
clinical instructor of orthopedics at the University of Utah 
Medical School (R. 766). He has performed over 300 
hip replacements (R. 834). Defendant's competency was never 
challenged. 
Defendant testified that there was a hint of possible 
component loosening in total hips in 1974, but that it was 
not being widely published at that time. He stayed abreast 
of the ongoing information as well as he could (R. 832). By 
the late 70's, loosening was a factor that could be expected 
down the line after an operation (R. 833) . He has revised 20 
of his approximately 300 total hip cases due to loosening (R. 
834) and had performed three fracture revisions by 1981 (R. 
849). He testified that from all of the evidence. Plaintiff 
did not have a loose femoral component in 1979 (R. 849) . She 
probably had no loosening prior to her accident (R. 849). 
There was nothing wrong with the hip components themselves 
following her accident (R. 794). 
Methyl methacralate cement contains barium which allows 
the cement to be visible on x-ray. The term "lucency" refers 
to a black area on the film which can indicate looseness of 
the components or cement (R. 790, 791). Looseness is always 
accompanied by pain (R. 835). A patient can have lucency on 
film without any looseness of components (R. 791). 
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Accordingly, revisions of the operation are not undertaken 
without patient symptoms (R. 791) . Revisions are much more 
difficult than the original operation (R. 791) . A physician 
cannot do preventive surgery, but must operate to correct 
symptoms (R. 791) • Defendant asked his patients to contact 
him if they had pain, rather than at regular intervals (R. 
835) . 
Defendant testified that he has had two patients who 
skied prior to their total hip surgery. They were both told 
they could not ski if he did their surgery (R. 824) . If 
Plaintiff had been involved in sports before her surgery, he 
would have talked with her about sports (R. 827) . He did not 
recall getting a telephone call from Plaintiff regarding 
skiing. If he had, his response would have been "no." (R. 
809) . 
Dr. Sherman Coleman. Dr. Coleman is an orthopedic 
surgeon, practicing primarily at the University of Utah 
Medical Center where he also teaches orthopedic surgery on a 
weekly basis (Deposition of Dr. Sherman Coleman, taken 6-12-
86, page 7). He has been president of the American 
Orthopedic Association and has been the Chief of Staff at 
Shriner's Hospital in Salt Lake City for 29 years (Coleman 
deposition, page 5). Dr. Coleman was called as an expert 
witness by defendant and testified through video deposition. 
Dr. Coleman testified that from his review of the 
records, x-rays and statements, Defendant's behavior was 
within the standard of care (Coleman deposition, page 16). 
To advise a patient that it is safe to go skiing would be a 
departure from the standard of care (Coleman deposition, page 
55)• Dr. Coleman knows of total hip recipients who do ski 
and play tennis (Coleman deposition, page 17). He allows his 
patients to play doubles and has patients who have become 
national tennis champions (Coleman deposition, page 34). 
Dr. Wallace Hess. Dr. Hess is an orthopedic surgeon 
practicing in Salt Lake City who was called as an expert 
witness by Defendant. Dr. Hess has done research in Europe 
on total hip replacements with Dr. John Charnley and has 
specialized in total joint surgery since 1970 (R. 863) . He 
has performed 1650 total hip replacements (R. 875) . After 
reviewing the case, Dr. Hess testified that Defendant's care 
of Plaintiff was very good (R. 866). 
Dr. Harold Dunn. Dr. Dunn was Plaintiff's treating 
physician at the time of trial. He was called as Plaintiff's 
witness and his testimony was presented by deposition. Dr. 
Dunn practices at the University of Utah where he has been 
chairman of the Division of Orthopedic Surgery since 1981. 
Upon Plaintiff's request, he assumed her care on April 24, 
1981 (Dunn deposition, page 3). 
Dr. Dunn testified that he permits his patients to do 
cross country skiing, but no waterskiing or snow skiing. He 
has many patients who ski, but it is not with his blessing 
(Dunn deposition, page 17). He tells patients the device is 
a walking hip only, and does not make a list of activities to 
avoid because the list can never be complete enough to 
address each new activity that people may think of (Dunn 
deposition, page 26). 
Dr. Dunn has his patients return for a one year checkup 
and every five years thereafter to assist him in compiling 
data for his research. His follow-up routine is definitely 
not the standard of the community (Dunn deposition, page 23). 
Dr. John P. Cranston. Dr. Cranston testified as 
Plaintiff's expert witness at trial. Dr. Cranston is a 52-
year-old California physician, who has performed 20-30 total 
hip operations (R. 658, 663). Since 1981, his practice has 
been largely limited to examination of patients for permanent 
disability evaluations and testifying in medical malpractice 
and personal injury actions (R. 670-672). He occasionally 
sees former patients, but is not a doctor that people go to 
for medical problems (R. 731). 
Dr. Cranston testified that the standard of care 
requires a doctor to tell his total hip patients specific 
activities they cannot engage in, including collision sports, 
mountain climbing, skiing, playing tennis with any degree of 
vigor and heavy loading or twisting. The standard required 
that these specific limitations be told to the patient 
several times, before and after surgery (R. 681) . 
Defendant's care was substandard because "the specific do's 
and don'ts down through a long list, for a complicated hip 
case, were not detailed to this woman" (R. 683) . It was not 
in compliance with the standard of care if Defendant waited 
for Plaintiff to ask specific questions before giving her 
advice (R. 683). 
Dr. Cranston testified that if Defendant did tell 
Plaintiff that she could ski in either 1974 or 1979, such 
advice was below the standard of care (R. 685, 686). It was 
below the standard of care if Defendant told Plaintiff that 
her right hip was as good as her left (R. 686). Defendant's 
failure to schedule follow-up appointments or x-ray 
examinations and his advice to come back as needed were 
substandard. He should have examined her every three to six 
months for the first year, and at six month intervals for the 
second (R. 688). Dr. Cranston had his patients come in 
annually thereafter for as long as necessary (R. 749). He 
testified that the wedding reception and alleged telephone 
conversation both represented additional opportunities for 
Defendant to ask Plaintiff to come in for a checkup (R. 691). 
Defendant's failure to examine her following the alleged 
telephone contact was substandard conduct (R. 689). 
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Dr. Cranston testified that multiple factors made 
Plaintiff a textbook complicated case as far as management 
follow-up was concerned (R. 689) . X-rays taken over time 
would probably have shown a deterioration of her hip (R. 
693). Procedures to minimize damage if deterioration is 
present include advising the patient to slow down on 
activities and use crutches* If further deterioration occurs 
and symptoms are present, replacement of the components may 
be required (R. 694). 
Dr. Jack Crosland. Dr. Crosland was Plaintiff's 
treating physician following her accident. Plaintiff read 
his deposition to the jury. During surgery he found the bone 
along the medial cortex of the femur to be paper thin 
(Crosland depositionf page 16). He cannot say whether x-rays 
taken the day before would have shown the bone to be paper 
thin (Crosland deposition, page 56). If the projection was 
just right, you could probably tell it was thin cortical bone 
(Crosland deposition, page 56). He has performed 25 or 30 
total hip procedures (Crosland deposition, page 30). He 
testified that Defendant's surgery was performed well 
(Crosland deposition, page 53). 
X-rays following the accident showed lucency between 
the cement and the cortex. In this instance, the lucency was 
a result of the fracture (Crosland deposition, page 35). The 
cement had not decomposed (Crosland deposition, page 36). 
Dr. Crosland tells his total hip patients they are going to 
have to live a sedentary lifestyle and does not recommend 
jogging, running, or active athletics (Crosland deposition, 
page 3 8)• He does not recommend that his patients ski 
(Crosland deposition, page 51). Dr. Crosland stated that in 
1974, doctors probably overestimated the functional life of 
total hips. They were placed in younger and younger people 
then, with the expectation that they would last for long 
periods. Since then, they have found they are not holding up 
as they had hoped and expected they would (Crosland 
deposition, page 37). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case is a very unusual medical malpractice action 
with an ongoing history of many years. It centers on Dr. 
Haslam's treatment of Mrs. Mikkelsen's total hip replacement 
in 1973 and 1974. Also at issue is an alleged telephone call 
placed five years later in 1979. The issues were resolved in 
a five day jury trial. Plaintiff makes no claim that she was 
unable to admit all of her evidence or that she was 
restricted in arguing any of her claims fully to the jury. 
Rather, plaintifffs argument is that the trial court 
should have eliminated the defenses of assumption of the risk 
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and contributory negligence from the case. Plaintiff argues 
that the defenses were inapplicable because the jury 
conclusively found that Dr. Haslam had advised Mrs. Mikkelsen 
that she could safely ski. 
Plaintiff's theory is without foundation. There is no 
specific jury finding to that effect. Nor can the jury's 
determination that Defendant was negligent be construed as a 
conclusion that he committed each act of negligence alleged 
by Plaintiff. Neither the jury instructions nor the special 
verdict form required Plaintiff to prove all of her claims 
before the jury could rule in her favor. 
Pla in t i f f presented several a l lega t ions of negligence 
to the jury, thereby broadening the t r i a l to encompass 
numerous medical and factual issues requiring the j u r y ' s 
de l ibera t ion . The claims were argued separately throughout 
t r i a l . No special interrogatory on the issue of skiing 
advice was presented to the jury . The j u r y ' s finding of 
negligence could be based on any one of her claims. I t 
cannot be concluded tha t the jury found tha t Defendant told 
P la in t i f f that she could s k i . 
Defendant testified that he never advised Plaintiff 
that she could ski and that he had instructed her not to load 
or twist the artificial hip. Skiing is a dangerous activity 
and each participant assumes the risks inherent in the sport. 
The facts surrounding Plaintiff's skiing accident presented 
sufficient evidence to support submission of assumption of 
risk and contributory negligence to the jury. These defenses 
are not barred by the physician-patient relationship that 
existed. The jury was correctly instructed as to the burden 
of proof on each issue and concluded that Plaintiff was 
negligent or assumed the risk of her injury by skiing. 
Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the requirements for reversal 
of a judgment on appeal and the verdict should stand. 
The trial court acted properly in refusing to enter 
judgment in Plaintiff's favor on the issue of liability or 
grant her a new trial on the question of damages. This Court 
has stated that it will not reverse a trial court's denial of 
a motion for a new trial unless there is a manifest abuse of 
discretion in the ruling. No such abuse of discretion has 
been established here. 
Moreover/ this is not the type of case where a new 
trial could properly be granted on the issue of damages 
alone. Plaintiff is not asking that an error in an award of 
damages be corrected. Rather, Plaintiff is asking this Court 
to disregard the jury's ruling and strike their answers to 
questions 3, 4 and 6 of the special verdict form which state 
that Plaintiff contributed to her injury to such an extent as 
to bar her from recovery. The jury verdict is supported by 
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competent evidence in the record. To remove those questions 
from deliberation would deprive Defendant of the privilege of 
presenting his side of contested issues to a jury. If a new 
trial is granted, it should, in fairness, encompass all 
issues. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE JURY DID NOT MAKE A FINDING THAT DEFENDANT 
HAD ADVISED PLAINTIFF THAT SHE COULD SAFELY SKI. 
A. The Trial Court's Instructions and Special Verdict 
Form Did Not Require the Plaintiff to Prove Each 
of Her Claims Before the Jury Could Find Defendant 
Negligent. 
Plaintiff's brief is based on the premise that the jury 
found that defendant specifically told her that she could 
ski, and that the giving of such advice was a cause of her 
injuries. Plaintiff's argument is without foundation. 
In Instruction No. 1, the trial court instructed the 
jury, in part, as follows: 
You are instructed that this is an action for 
medical malpractice filed by DaNiece Mikkelsen, 
the plaintiff, against Marian J. Haslam, M.D. 
The plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that she 
had been a patient of the defendant, Marian J. 
Haslam, M.D., for the period of time from January 
1973, up to and including March 1980. During that 
period of time, the plaintiff alleges that the 
defendant was negligent and provided medical 
services and advice that were below the standard 
of care for a doctor with the defendant's medical 
specialty as a board certified orthopedic 
surgeon. 
More specifically, plaintiff alleges that the 
defendant was negligent in the following: 
1) In failing to properly advise DaNiece 
Mikkelsen in the limitations that should be placed 
on her physical activity in light of the nature of 
the prosthetic device and its fit in her leg and 
hip area. 
2) In advising DaNiece Mikkelsen in early 1979 
that she could go skiing when Dr. Haslam knew or 
in the exercise of reasonable care should have 
known that such activity could not be safely 
undertaken by a woman whose hip was in the 
condition that Dr. Haslam knew or should have 
known it to be in at the time of the advice. 
3) In improperly advising Mrs. Mikkelsen that she 
could go skiing without appropriate follow-up 
examinations sufficient to apprise himself of the 
conditions that developed as a natural result of 
the surgery that was performed by Dr. Haslam. 
4) In failing to perform physical and x-ray 
examinations on a regular basis of the hip and leg 
area where the total hip replacement procedure was 
performed in the months and years following said 
operation. 
The plaintiff, DaNiece Mikkelsen, further alleges 
that these negligent acts either individually or 
jointly caused her injury, damage and loss . . . 
(emphasis added). 
(R. 269, 270, Appendix 2). 
This instruction was written by Plaintiff and was 
adopted by the court at her request. 
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Plaintiff requested an additional instruction stating 
that she need not prove each claim in her complaint for the 
jury to find Defendant negligent (R. 198). The instruction 
was rejected by the court. It was cumulative and unnecessary 
in light of the specific language of Instruction No. 1 that 
the alleged acts either individually or jointly caused 
Plaintiff's loss. 
This Court has stated: 
When the error assigned is the giving or failure 
to give instructions, the real inquiry should be 
were the issues of fact necessary to be 
determined, and the principles of law applicable 
thereto, correctly presented to the jury in a 
clear and understandable manner? That is the 
purpose of instruction and if it is accomplished, 
the failure to give additional ones is not of 
controlling importance. 
Wellman v.. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 352, 366 P.2d 701, 702 
(1961). 
Plaintiff extends her argument that the jury found in 
her favor on each issue by claiming that the trial court 
improperly used the term "the proximate cause" when defining 
the term in its Instruction No. 8 (Appendix 3). Plaintiff 
argues that the instruction implied that Plaintiff had the 
burden of proving each of her claims of negligence to arrive 
at the conclusion that Defendant's conduct was "the proximate 
cause" of her injuries. 
The instructions read as a whole defeat this argument. 
Instruction No. 3 had originally stated that Plaintiff had 
the burden of proving both that Defendant was negligent and 
that his negligence was "the legal cause" of Plaintiff's 
injuries. Upon Plaintiff's request/ the court changed the 
instruction to require Plaintiff to prove that Defendant's 
negligence was "a proximate cause" of her injuries (R. 90f 
Appendix 4). The special verdict form also asked the jury 
to determine whether the negligence of either party was "a 
cause" of her injuries. 
The jury was correctly directed to read these 
instructions as one connected whole (Instruction No. 31 , 
Appendix 5, R. 304). When so read/ the instruction on 
proximate cause does not mandate as Plaintiff suggests. 
At the conclusion of the jury instructions/ the jurors 
were given a special verdict formf which asked "Was defendant 
negligent as alleged by plaintiff?" (Appendix 6). Plaintiff 
argues that this formf read in conjunction with her 
Instruction No. lf required the jurors to conclude that 
Defendant had committed each of the four acts alleged before 
they coula find him negligent. Plaintiff therefore concludes 
that their finding of negligence necessarily reflects a 
determination that Defendant told Plaintiff she could ski. 
Plaintiff's theory forces a strained interpretation of 
the specific language used. No words to that effect are 
included in the instruction. Indeed, it is difficult to 
imagine that Plaintiff would have proposed the instruction if 
she felt it could reasonably be interpreted as such an "all 
or nothing" charge. All that can be discerned from the 
jury's verdict is that Plaintiff was successful in proving at 
least one of her claims by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Plaintiff's conclusion that the jury specifically found that 
Defendant advised Plaintiff that she could ski is simply 
without foundation. 
B. Plaintiff s Claims of Negligence Were Treated as 
Separate Issues Throughout Trial. 
Plaintiff's four claims of negligence were treated as 
separate issues at trial. Plaintiff's counsel argued the 
claims of negligence individually in his summation to the 
jury. He argued that Defendant had a duty to schedule 
Plaintiff for yearly x-ray examinationsf adding: 
And if that be true, that duty was owed and that 
duty breached, and she was injured as a proximate 
result of the breach of that duty, she's entitled 
to a verdict at your hands in this case. It's 
just that simple. And that would be true whether 
that telephone conversation occurred or whether it 
didn't occur. What difference does it make, if 
she wasn't taken care of, if she wasn't 
sufficiently instructed and advised by this 
physician and surgeon. (Emphasis added). 
(R. 917) . 
Plaintiff's counsel also argued: 
The first and foremost duty that he owed under the 
law and facts of this case, was to make a complete 
and full disclosure to the patient of the do's and 
don'ts, of the risks involved in this operation. 
If he fell short of that duty, then he breached 
that duty, and that, in the eyes of the law, is 
negligence. 
(R. 906, 907) . 
Plaintiff's counsel reiterated the severability of the 
issues by saying "We claim three things. This woman wasn't 
adequately instructed at the commencement and the threshold 
of this case. She wasn't given adequate advice when the 
telephone call took place, and the follow-up, which is the 
final, final controlling issue here, was not had" (R. 919) . 
It was never suggested to the jury by either party that 
Plaintiff needed to prove each of these claims in order to 
prevail. 
Plaintiff could have chosen to narrow the issues by 
limiting the trial itself to the sole question of whether Dr. 
Haslam advised Plaintiff that she could safely ski. 
Defendant's deposition, taken in 1981, sets forth his denial 
of the telephone call and his admission that such advice, if 
given, would violate the standard of care. This standard was 
confirmed, without exception, by Doctors Dunn, Hess, Coleman 
and Crosland, all of whom were deposed before trial. Instead 
of relying on this single factual issue and using the 
uncontroverted standard of caref Plaintiff chose, as was her 
privilegef to substantially broaden the medical and factual 
issues via her expert witness, Dr. John Cranston. 
As stated above, Dr. Cranston's criticism of defendant 
was multifaceted. His scattergun approach to Defendant's 
claimed failures gave the jury many aspects of treatment to 
evaluate, far beyond the alleged advice regarding skiing. 
In reviewing the evidence, the jury may have concluded 
that Defendant did not advise Plaintiff that she could ski, 
but that he should have scheduled her for regular follow-up 
examinations and x-rays. The jurors may have found 
Defendant's advice regarding the limitations for Plaintiff to 
use with her hip or his instructions on the nature and fit of 
the components to be inadequate. They may have even been 
influenced by the allegations of below standard conduct 
raised by Dr. Cranston which tangentially related to 
Plaintiff's claims, such as failure to schedule her for an 
appointment following the wedding reception and alleged 
telephone call. It is impossible to now isolate the basis 
for their decision. 
Plaintiff asks this Court to interpret the jury finding 
beyond what it is to a finding that Defendant told Plaintiff 
to go ahead and ski. As we have argued, this is a specious 
position that flies in the face of the actual fact and the 
instructions by the Court. It is fruitless and beyond the 
role of the judiciary to speculate as to the minds of the 
jurors; the issue is simply does the evidence support the 
verdict. 
Plaintiff chose not to request a special interrogatory 
on the issue of whether Defendant had advised her that she 
could safely ski. She submitted three proposed verdict forms 
to the court, none of which asked the jury to make a specific 
finding on that issue. Such an interrogatory/ if requested, 
would have been discretionary with the court. Absent its 
use, it cannot be stated that the jury found Defendant 
advised Plaintiff that she could ski. 
II. 
THERE WAS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S SUBMISSION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
AND ASSUMPTION OF RISK TO THE JURY. 
A. Skiing is a Sport that Carries Inherent Risks and 
Dangers. 
The evidence presented at trial established what is 
commonly and generally known - that skiing is a dangerous 
sport. Plaintiff's witness. Ken Herrick, a member of the 
Powder Mountain Volunteer Ski Patrol for thirteen years, 
testified that people are frequently hurt while skiing, and 
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that "it's tradition that you break your leg skiing" (R. 
634) • This was confirmed by the medical witnesses at trial, 
and Plaintiff herself testified that she knew when she 
started participating in the sport that people got hurt and 
broke their legs while skiing (R. at 572)• 
The common knowledge that skiing is dangerous was 
recognized by the Utah Legislature when it enacted Utah Code 
Annotated 78-27-52(1), 1953 as amended. While not 
controlling heref the statute does reflect Utah's recognition 
of the well known risks of skiing. The statute reads: 
1) "Inherent risks of skiing" means those dangers 
or conditions which are an integral part of the 
sport of skiing, including, but not limited to: 
changing weather conditions, variations or 
steepness in terrain; snow or ice conditions; 
surface or sub-surface conditions such as bare 
spots, forest growth, rocks, stumps, impact with 
lift towers and other structures and their 
components; collisions with other skiers; and a 
skier's failure to ski within his own ability. 
The inherent dangers of the sport are also noted 
throughout the case law concerning ski accidents. See the 
Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 1447 "Skier's Liability for Injuries to 
or Death of Another Person" (1969) , which states: "One of 
the basic rules applying to sports participants generally is 
that a person who takes part in a sport, accepts the dangers 
that inhere in it insofar as they are obvious and necessary." 
The dangers known to exist in skiing were recognized by 
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in LaVine v. Clear Creek 
Skiing Corp., 557 F.2d 730 (10th Cir. 1977). Plaintiff, an 
expert skier, was struck by her instructor when she stopped 
on the ski hill. Her knee was shattered. The jury found the 
instructor free of negligence and the Plaintiff free of 
contributory negligence. The Plaintiff argued that the 
collision itself conclusively established both the 
Defendant's negligence and the Plaintiff's right to recover. 
The appellate court disagreed, noting: 
It is true that the jury in a ski slope case tends 
to view the entire skiing scene as one involving a 
high degree of hazard in which the skier assumes a 
degree of risk by merely taking to the slopes. 
This is an attitude which tends to be persuasive 
in injuries which involve participation in sports. 
Assuming this is the attitude, it is inappropriate 
for us to reach out, so to speak, in an effort to 
change the result. The jury has considered the 
case, and this court has not acted so as to 
prejudice the appellant. The verdict must stand. 
Id. at 735. 
While a skier does not blanketly assume the risk of any 
possible injury that may happen on the slope, he or she does 
assume the obvious risks inherent in the sport, such as 
injury stemming from bad weather conditions, heavy snow, or 
simply falling on the hill. Plaintiff argues, however, that 
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the trial court improperly presented the issues of 
contributory negligence and assumption of risk to the jury on 
the particular facts of this case. In view of the dangers of 
the sport itself and the evidence presented at trial, both 
defenses were appropriate. 
B. The Facts Sustained the Submission of the 
Issue of Contributory Negligence to the Jury. 
The standard for determining whether the issue of 
contributory negligence should be submitted to a jury was 
outlined by this Court in Simpson v. General Motor Corp., 24 
Utah 2d 301, 303f 470 P.2d 399, 401, (1970). The Court held: 
Consideration of the justification of submitting 
the issue of contributory negligence is analogous 
to making the same determination as to primary 
negligence: whether there is a basis in the 
evidence upon which reasonable minds could 
conclude that the plaintiff was negligent in that 
he failed to exercise that degree of care which an 
ordinary, reasonable and prudent person would have 
observed under the circumstances. 
The following evidence presented at trial justified the 
submission of the issue of contributory negligence to the 
jury: 
Plaintiff chose to ski on a day when conditions were 
less than ideal. As stated earlier, the skies were overcast, 
snow had fallen the night before, and the slope was not 
packed, but only partially groomed. The light was not very 
good. It had been snowing recently and the Ski Patrol 
Incident Form lists the snow conditions as heavy powder. 
Plaintiff skied the Drifter run which contained areas of 
beginner, intermediate and expert terrain. Plaintiff's 
safety bindings did not release during the fall and were not 
examined. 
The "Patient's Description of the Incident" on the Ski 
Patrol Incident Form states "making a turn to the right, left 
ski edge caught, went straight downhill resulting in doing 
the splits, falling to her knees with her skis extended". 
Defendant maintains the jury could reasonably have 
concluded that plaintiff contributed to her own injury by 
skiing under the conditions stated. 
The court instructed the jury on the issue as follows: 
"Contributory negligence is negligence on the part of a 
person injured which, cooperating with the negligence of 
another, assists in proximately causing his own injury" 
(Instruction No. 6, R. 276). The court was clear in 
directing the jury that defendant had the burden of proving 
that Plaintiff was negligent or assumed the risk of her 
injuries and also of proving that Plaintiff's act was a 
proximate cause of her injuries. (Instruction No. 4, 
Appendix 7, R. 274) . These instructions correctly stated the 
basis for the defense, together with its burden of proof. 
The issue was in all respects correctly presented to the 
jury. 
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C. Submission of the Defense of Assumption of Risk was 
Proper on the Facts of This Case* 
The trial court was also justified in presenting the 
issue of assumption of risk to the jury. In Rigtrup v. 
Strawberry Water Users Ass'n,, 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1977), 
this Court stated that assumption of risk remains a viable 
defense under Utah law. The Court held: 
[I]t requires but little reflection to see that 
where there is a known danger, the risk of which 
is voluntarily assumed by a party, such action may 
well fall within the lack of care which 
constitutes negligence and also may be correctly 
termed an assumption of risk. If such be the 
situation, the party should be charged with the 
responsibility for his conduct, by whatever term 
it may be called; and the comparative negligence 
statute quoted above should be applied as the 
trial court correctly did in this case. 
Id. at 1250. 
The evidence presented at trial showed a sufficient 
basis from which the jury could conclude that Plaintiff was 
aware of the dangers of skiing, that she had been instructed 
not to subject her hip to twisting or loading, and that she 
voluntarily chose to participate in the sport. As such, 
there was sufficient evidence to justify submitting an 
instruction of assumption of risk to the jury. 
Plaintiff excepted to the defense and alleges error in 
the trial court's refusal to give the following instruction 
when the issue was allowed to go to the jury: 
Instruction No, 17. You are instructed that 
defendant has alleged in his answer as a defense 
that plaintiff assumed the risks incident to her 
skiing activities. In this connection, you are 
further instructed that plaintiff in legal 
contemplation cannot be held to have assumed the 
risks incident to her accident unless defendant 
proves by a preponderance of the evidence: 
1. That plaintiff was given medical advice 
before the accident that there was an unusual risk 
to her total hip replacement if she were to ski; 
and 
2. That having knowledge of such risk, she 
nevertheless undertook to ski and to assume said 
risk in disregard of said medical advice. 
The trial court properly refused Plaintiff's requested 
instruction. The language would have required Defendant to 
prove that he specifically told Plaintiff not to ski. As 
stated earlier. Defendant testified that he advised her not 
to twist, run or lift with the hip, but did not talk with her 
specifically about skiing. If Plaintiff was aware that she 
was to avoid these activities, it is reasonable to conclude 
that she would be assuming the risk of injury if she 
undertook them, whether or not she had been specifically 
advised as to skiing. 
The Rigtrup decision, cited above, held that since 
assumption of the risk was not abolished under Utah law, it 
was not error to submit an instruction on the doctrine to the 
jury. Assumption of the risk is part of the assessment of 
negligence that is properly reserved for the jury. Id. at 
1251. Instruction No. 7 adopted by the trial court in this 
case followed the Rigtrup format by specifically informing 
the jurors that assumption of the risk is a doctrine of law 
within the concept of comparative negligence. The full text 
of the instruction reads: 
Instruction No. J_. Assumption of risk is a 
doctrine of law encompassed within the concept of 
comparative negligence. This doctrine will not 
permit a party who is doing wrong to place the 
blame on another and recover therefor. Assumption 
of risk is a voluntary and unreasonable exposure 
to a known danger, or a danger that should have 
been known to a reasonable person in the same or 
similar position. 
(R. 277). 
In this case, Plaintiff's knowledge and appreciation of 
the dangers involved in her skiing was a question for the 
jury. The trial court acted properly in submitting the 
defense as an issue to be determined at trial. 
D. A Physician-Patient Relationship Does Not Bar 
Application of Contributory Negligence and 
Assumption of Risk in Appropriate Medical 
Malpractice Suits. 
It is beyond dispute that contributory negligence is a 
proper defense in medical malpractice actions. 61 Am. Jur. 
2d, Physicians and Surgeons, Section 302 (1981), outlines the 
application of the defense as follows: 
The creation of the relation of physician and 
patient gives rise to reciprocal duties to 
exercise due care: that of the physician to his 
patient, and that of the patient to his physician 
and himself in relation to the physician's 
treatment in endeavoring to effect a cure. Thus, 
it has been said that it is the duty of the 
patient to use such care as a person of ordinary 
prudence would ordinarily use in circumstances 
like his own, and that if he fails to do this he 
cannot hold the physician answerable for the 
consequences of his own want of ordinary care. 
Id. at 448. 
Plaintiff argues, however, that under the cases she 
cites, the defense was improperly applied here. 
Both Halverson v^ Zimmerman, 232 N.W. 754 (N.D. 1930) 
and Schoonover v. Holden, 87 N.W. 754 (Iowa 1901) cited by 
Plaintiff deal with improper jury instructions which sought 
to extend a patient's duty beyond the duty of due care 
universally recognized by law. In Halverson the Defendant 
doctor argued that the patient had a duty to seek treatment 
elsewhere when he became aware that he was not receiving 
proper care from the Defendant. The appellate court rejected 
the instruction, citing the language quoted in Plaintiff's 
brief that a patient has no duty to distrust his physician or 
appeal to others to ascertain the quality of care being 
received. 
In Schoonover a defendant physician likewise sought an 
instruction that the jury had to consider the plaintiff's 
personal knowledge of her condition and whether she had 
contacted other physicians to verify the defendant's medical 
conclusions. The appellate court rejected this instruction 
noting that "the court in its own instructions gave the jury 
the correct rule as to her contributory negligence and this 
was sufficient." Id., at 737. 
In the present case, no such instructions seeking to 
expand the duties of a patient were requested. The 
instructions on negligence dealt only with the standard of 
reasonable care traditionally used in negligence suits 
(Instruction No. 5, R. 275, Appendix 8). 
Morrison v^ MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555 (D.C. 1979) also 
cited by Plaintiff/ deals exclusively with the issue of a 
patient's assumption of the risk of a particular medical 
procedure, not assumption of the risk of a dangerous sport 
like skiing. Defendant has never raised the defense of 
assumption of risk in reference to any aspect of his medical 
care. Accordingly the issues in Morrison do not parallel 
those here. 
Los Alamos Medical Center, Inc. v. Coef 58 N.W. 686, 
275 P.2d 175 (1954) 50 A.L.R.2d 1033, stands for the 
proposition that contributory negligence was not shown to the 
extent that it would bar plaintiff's recovery as a matter of 
law. In Los Alamos, as here, contributory negligence was a 
factual issue reserved for the jury. 
If Plaintiff had abandoned her other allegations of 
negligence and proceeded solely on the claim of the advice 
regarding skiing, her arguments under the cases she cites 
would be more persuasive. Even then, Defendant submits, 
these affirmative defenses would have been viable issues. 
There is a distinction between following a doctor's order (as 
in the cases cited by Plaintiff) and simply seeking approval 
or acquiescence in an activity Plaintiff had decided, for her 
own reasons, to pursue. Each person is responsible for her 
own actions, and even in that assumed scenario, defense 
counsel could properly call into question both the fact of 
skiing, and the particular factual circumstances of this 
accident as bearing on comparative negligence and assumption 
of risk. 
This Court is not being called upon to decide that 
narrow issue, however. With Plaintiff's decision to include 
several claims of medical error, the jury was required to 
evaluate all aspects of Defendant's treatment in assessing 
whether he was negligent. If their finding of negligence was 
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based on any of these other allegations, the questions of 
contributory negligence and assumption of risk address a 
completely independant act by Plaintiff, not related to any 
claimed advice by Dr. Haslam that she could safely ski. 
It is important to note that Plaintiff effectively 
argued to the jury that if they found Defendant advised 
Plaintiff that she could ski, she would not be negligent for 
following that advice. In closing argument, Plaintiff's 
attorney told the jury: 
Whether she was contributorily negligent for going 
up there and skiing, depends on whether she had 
advice to not do that kind of activity, not 
perform, or worse still, advice that she could go 
and do that, because there again, if there was an 
absence of proper instruction, then she would have 
no particular reason not to go up there and ski. 
And on the other hand, if she received instruction 
that it was all right, then by following that 
instruction, she couldn't possibly be negligent, 
because the only claim could be then that she was 
negligent for following the advice and instruction 
of the doctor. She didn't know the risk. You 
can't assume the risk that you don't know about. 
She hasn't been told what the risk was. She 
hasn't been advised of the risk. And so I would 
say that the defense folds. 
(R. 921). 
The jury rejected Plaintiff's argument and barred 
Plaintiff from recovery. 
E. Plaintiff Has Failed to Meet the Requirements for 
Reversal of a Jury Verdict on Appeal. 
Plaintiff's assignments of error are governed by well-
established principles of appellate review. The test 
established by this Court for determining whether a jury 
verdict should be reversed is set forth in Rowley v. Graven 
Brothers &. Company, 26 Utah 2d 448, 491 P.2d 1209 (1971). 
The Court stated: 
The mandate of our law is that we do not reverse 
for mere error or irregularity. We do so only if 
the complaining party has been deprived of a fair 
trial. The test to be applied is: Was there 
error or irregularity such that there is a 
reasonable likelihood to believe that in its 
absence there would have been a result more 
favorable to him? If upon a survey of the whole 
evidence this question must be answered in the 
negative, then there is no justifiable basis for 
reversal of a judgment. 
Id. at 451, 491 P.2d at 1211. 
Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits 
reversal of a judgment unless an act or omission of the Judge 
is inconsistent with substantial justice. Moreover, it must 
be established that such act or omission was prejudicial such 
that in its absence there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
different result. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61. 
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This Court has also stated that it will upset a jury 
verdict "only upon a showing that the evidence so clearly 
preponderates in favor of the appellant that reasonable 
people would not differ on the outcome." Bundy v. Century 
Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984), citing E_=- A^ 
Strout Western Realty Agency v^ . W\ £LL Fay and Son, 665 P.2d 
1320, 1322 (1983). 
Although the evidence at trial was in conflict, there 
is substantial evidence to support the jury's determination 
that Plaintiff contributed to her injury or assumed its risk. 
The parties have each had a fair opportunity to fully present 
their claims to the jury. The Court adequately set forth the 
theories of each party and stated the principles of Utah law 
governing their determination. There have been no acts or 
omissions of the trial court which could be deemed 
inconsistent with substantial justice. The trial was fair 
and the verdict should stand. 
III. 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED JUDGMENT IN HER 
FAVOR OR A NEW TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES. 
A* The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 
Denying Plaintiff s Motion for a New Trial. 
In a proper case, a new trial may be granted on less 
than all of the issues. However, as stated in 58 Am. Jur. 
2d, New Trial, Section 27 (1971): 
It has been said that the instances in which a 
new trial upon the issue of damages alone may be 
proper are comparatively infrequent, and that the 
right to a new trial limited to the issue of 
damages is one which should be exercised sparingly 
and with great caution. 
This court expressed its reluctance to overturn a trial 
court's ruling on a motion for a new trial in Page v. Utah 
Home Fire Ins. Co, 15 Utah 2d 257, 391 P.2d 290 (1964). Page 
involved an action to recover on two insurance policies when 
a building was destroyed by fire. The plaintiff was denied 
recovery on either policy. The trial judge determined that 
the issues on the policies should have been submitted to the 
jury separately and ordered a new trial on the issue of 
whether the plaintiff failed to disclose material facts when 
applying for the $10,000 policy. This Court upheld the trial 
court's ruling, noting that decisions to grant a new trial 
will not be reversed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of 
discretion. The Court held: 
The broad discretionary power of the trial court 
in the granting or denying of new trials is well 
established. This is necessarily so to allow the 
court an opportunity to cause re-examination or 
correction of jury verdicts or findings which it 
A1 
believes to be in error or where there is 
substantial doubt that they were fairly tried. 
And we have repeatedly expressed our reluctance to 
interfere with its judgment in such matters unless 
the action is clearly unreasonable and arbitrary. 
Id. at 261, 391 P.2d at 292. 
No abuse of discretion has been established in Judge 
Hyde's refusal to grant Plaintiff's motion for a new trial. 
From his first-hand view of the evidence and proceedings. 
Judge Hyde has approved the trial proceedings. No abuse of 
discretion has been shown in that decision. 
B. A New Trial Should Not Be Granted On the Issue of 
Damages. 
This is not the type of case when a new trial could 
properly be granted on the issue of damages alone. It is not 
a case where the jury awarded Plaintiff a low sum in damages 
which she seeks to increase. Rather, it is a case where the 
jury specifically ruled that she was to receive no recovery. 
The jury was accurately instructed as to the ramifications of 
their finding Plaintiff and Defendant equally negligent. 
(See Instruction No. 30, Appendix 9). Their unanimous intent 
to award no damages recovery was placed on the record 
following their return of the special verdict form to the 
court. After noting the jury's failure to address the 
question of damages, Judge Hyde asked: 
The Court: The end result of your verdict, as I take it is, 
you feel both of them contributed and there 
should be no recovery, right? Is that what 
you're saying. 
Jurors: (All respond in the affirmative). 
The Court: All of you? 
Jurors: (All respond in the affirmative). 
(R. 971) . 
Plaintiff is asking that this intent be disregarded and 
that the Court strike their answers to questions 3, 4 and 6 
on the Special Verdict Form. This amounts to a request that 
the Court strike the jury verdict, enter judgment in 
Plaintiff's favor and grant a new trial on damages alone, all 
without the benefit of having observed and evaluated the 
testimony of witnesses on matters sharply contested at trial. 
The dangers of this practice were noted by Justice 
Streissguth in his dissent in Lee v. Zaske, 213 Minn. 244, 6 
N.W.2d 793 (1942), a case cited as precedent by Plaintiff. 
In Lee a decedent was found contributorily negligent when he 
was struck by a car in an auto-pedestrian accident. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court found a total absence of proof of 
negligence on decedent's part (as distinguished from our 
case) and found defendant had been prima facie negligent 
under a statute for having faulty brakes. The court found 
AR 
the evidence of negligence conclusive and ordered a new trial 
on the issue of damages only. Xd. at 796. 
Justice Streissguth concurred in granting a new trialf 
but dissented to limiting the issue to damages only. He 
noted that to do so would amount to the equivalent of 
entering a judgment in the plaintiff's favor when no such 
motion had been made during or after trial. Justice 
Streissguth reasoned: 
The practice of excluding from a new trial issues 
which have been determined satisfactorily on the 
first trial has frequently been followed by this 
court. [Citations omitted]. In each of these 
cases the original verdict of the jury upon the 
excluded issues was left undisturbed, not entirely 
brushed aside and a diametrically opposite 
decision on the facts substituted therefor. The 
new trial on the one issue was without 
interference with the jury's findings on the other 
issue. [Citations omitted]. Sof in cases where juries have allowed inadequate or excessive 
damages, this court has repeatedly allowed their 
verdict to stand on the issue of liability, 
granting new trials only on the issue of damages; 
but that is not what the majority here proposes to 
do. It proposes to substitute its verdict on the 
main issue for the verdict of the jury, and this 
is an action at law in which a jury trial is a 
fundamental right. 
Id. at 797. 
In similar fashion, Plaintiff here is not asking this 
Court to leave the other issues undisturbed, but is rather 
asking that all matters be reversed except the findings in 
her favor on the issues of negligence and causation. 
Sturm, Ruger l Co,, Inc., v. Day, 615 P.2d 621 (Alaska 
1980), also cited by plaintiff/ notes: 
It has been held that a partial new trial will not 
be permitted "when a tangled or complex fact 
situation would make it unfair to one party to 
determine damages apart from liability, or where, 
'there is reason to think that the verdict may 
represent a compromise among jurors with different 
views on whether the defendant was liable.1 
[Citations omitted]. Vizzini V. Ford Motor Co., 
569 F.2d 754f 760 (3d. Cir. 1977). 
Id. at 623. 
In Wellman v^ Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701, 
(1961), also cited in plaintiff's brief, this Court upheld 
the trial court's decision to grant a new trial when it 
appeared clear from the evidence that the jury had not 
understood the law regarding damages. This Court refused, 
however, to allow the trial to be limited the issue of 
damages only, noting: 
Although the order granting a new trial on damages 
only is permitted by our Rules of Civil Procedure, 
we think that justice and fairness in this case 
require a new trial on all the issues and not 
merely on the amount of damages. 
Id. at 355, 366 P.2d at 704. 
In the other Utah case cited by Plaintiffs, Judd v. 
Rowley's Cherry Hill Orchards, Inc., 611 P.2d 1216 (Utah 
1980), this Court upheld a jury verdict finding Plaintiff 30% 
negligent and Defendant 70% negligent. Plaintiff had argued 
that there was no basis in evidence for finding her negligent 
and that the issue should not have been presented to the 
jury. On review, this Court found there was at least some 
credible evidence in the record to establish negligence. The 
Court stated: 
While the degree of negligence attributed to the 
plaintiff may arguably have been high, as the 
District Court observed, in view of the evidence 
in this case/ it is within the prerogative of the 
jury to make that determination, and we do not 
overturn a jury verdit if there is any credible 
evidence on which reasonable minds could conclude 
as the jury did. 
Id. at 1220. 
The Court went on to grant a new trial on the issue of 
the damages only , l eav ing the j u r y ' s d i v i s i o n of negl igence 
intact. It is important to note, however, that even on these 
facts, Chief Justice Crockett and Justice Hall dissented to 
limiting the new trial to the question of damages only. 
Justice Crockett's dissent reads: 
There is yet another reason why I think the 
Court's decision herein does not treat the parties 
fairly. If the verdict and judgment are unsound, 
the case should be remanded for trial on all 
issues. This is a prime example of the kind of 
case that the trial court and jury should have the 
entire picture relating to the contested issues in 
order to properly assess damages, if that becomes 
necessary. According to my experience and 
judgment, this type of situation can result in a 
lop-sided and unfair trial unless the parties each 
have the opportunity of presenting fully their 
evidence and contentions to the jury. Consistent 
with honoring the right of the parties to a trial 
by jury, I would affirm the judgment; but at the 
very least would not deprive the defendants the 
privilege of presenting their side of all disputed 
issues. 
Id. at 1222. 
Defendant maintains that judgment in this case should 
be affirmed, but that if a new trial is ordered, it must, in 
fairness, encompass all issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the facts and law stated herein, Respondent 
respectfully requests that the judgment be affirmed. 
DATED this "J 7) day of July, 1987. 
Respectfuly submitted, 
CAMPBELL & NEELEY 
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL $4286 
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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Appendix 1 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that this is an action for medical 
malpractice filed by DaNiece Mikkelsen, the plaintifff against 
Marian J. Haslam, M.D. 
The plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that she had 
been a patient of the defendant, Marian J. Haslam, M.D., for the 
period of time from January, 1973, up to and including March, 
1980. During that period of time, the plaintiff alleges that 
the defendant was negligent and provided medical services and 
advice that were below the standard of care for a doctor with 
the defendant's medical specialty as a board certified ortho-
pedic surgeon. 
more specifically, plaintiff alleges that the detendant 
was negligent in the following: 
1 Improper diagnosis 6f the original condition 
a^nd status of DaNiece Mikkelsen1s hip and leg. 
2) In failing to properly advise DaNiece Mikkelsen 
in the limitations that should be placed on her 
physical activity in light of the nature of the 
prosthetic device and its fit in her leg and 
hip area. 
3) In advising DaNiece Mikkelsen in early 1979 
that she could go skiing when Dr. Haslam knew 
or in the exercise of reasonable care should 
have known that such activity could not be 
safely undertaken by a woman whose hip was in 
the condition that Dr. Haslam knew or should 
have known it to be in at the time of the 
advice. 
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4) In improperly advising Mrs. Mikkelsen that she 
could go skiing without appropriate follow-up 
examinations sufficient to apprise himself of 
the condition that developed as a natural 
result of the surgery that was performed by Dr. 
Haslam. 
5) In failing to perform physical and x-ray 
examinations on a regular basis of the hip and 
leg area where the total hip replacement proce-
dure was performed in the months and years 
following said operation. 
The plaintiff, DaNiece Mikkelsen, further alleges that 
these negligent acts either individually or jointly caused her 
injury, damage and loss. She further requests damages in her 
Complaint for loss of bodily function, pain and suffering, both 
mental and physical, loss of wages and wage earning capacity and 
for medical, doctor and hospital bills, as well as for the 
deformed and functionally impaired leg and hip. The plaintiff 
asks that judgment be entered against defendant in an amount for 
damages that is reasonable as determined by the jury. 
In his Answer, the defendant, Marian J. Haslam, M.D., 
states that he rendered medical care and treatment to the 
plaintiff, DaNiece Mikkelsen, on or about March, 1974, but 
denies that he continued to treat her thereafter until March of 
1980. He generally denies all of the other allegations of 
neglect in plaintifffs Complaint. The defendant, Marian J. 
Haslam, M.D., further asserts that plaintiff DaNiece Mikkelsen 
was contributorily negligent to a degree as great or greater 
A-4 CA : o 
than his negligence. Defendant further states as a defense that 
the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily assumed the risk of the 
injury and damages that she experienced. In further defense, 
the defendant alleges that the statute of limitations concerning 
his conduct has run. 
The foregoing constitutes the allegations of the 
parties and is not to be taken by you as evidence in the case. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in 
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient 
intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the 
result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause, the 
one that necessarily sets in operation the factors that 
accomplished the injury. 
It may operate directly or through intermediate agencies 
or through conditions created by such agencies. 
Appendix 4 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
Plaintiff must carry the burden of proof on the 
following issues: 
1) That defendant was negligent; and 
fl pv Ml •*><?* 
2) t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s negl igence was wre 1-qspjl cause 
of p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r i e s and damages; and 
3) the e x t e n t and amount of p l a i n t i f f ' s i n j u r i e s 
and damages. 
Appendix 5 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
These instructions, though numbered separately, are to 
be considered and construed as one connected whole. Each 
instruction should be read and understood in reference to and as 
a part of the entire charge and not as though any one sentence or 
instruction separately were intended to state the whole law orf 
the case upon any particular point. Moreover, the order in which 
the instructions are given has no significance as to their 
relative importance. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT %tiWEBBR''Ce&,NTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DaNIECE MIKKELSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARLAN J. HASLAM, M.D., 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
Case No. 77934 
We, the jury impaneled to try the issues in the above-
entitled casef give the following answers to the questions 
propounded to us. 
QUESTION NO. 1; Was defendant negligent as alleged by 
plaintiff? 
YES \ 
NO 
QUESTION NO. 2; If your answer to Question No. 1 is 
"yes", was such negligence a cause of the injuries received by 
plaintiff? 
iES \ 
NO 
QUESTION NO. 3: Was plaintiff negligent, or did she 
assume the risk of injury, by skiing? 
YES ^ 
NO 
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Case No. 77934 
QUESTION NO. 4: If your answer to Question No. 3 is 
"yes", was such negligence or assumption of risk a cause of the 
injuries sustained by plaintiff? 
YES X 
NO 
QUESTION NO. 5: Concerning only the evidence concerning 
damages and without being concerned with the effect of fault of 
either party on damages in answering this question, what amount 
of money would fairly and adequately compensate plaintiff for 
injury sustained as a result of the accident of March 2, 1980? 
GENERAL DAMAGES: $ 
SPECIAL DAMAGES: $ 
If you have answered Questions No. 1 and 2 and have 
found that both plaintiff and defendant were negligent in a way 
that caused the injuries, answer the following question. 
QUESTION NO. 6: Considering all of the negligence of 
plaintiff that you have found to be a cause of her injuries, and 
all of the negligence of defendant that you have found to be a 
cause of her injuries to total 100%, you will now allocate the 
100% negligence between the parties. You will weigh the 
negligence of each party against the other party and determine 
. Appendix 6 
Indeed 
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t h e r e l a t i v e negl igence of each pa r ty in r e l a t i o n to the o t h e r . 
Your answer in pe rcen tages w i l l r e f l e c t your d e c i s i o n . What p a r t 
of t h a t 100% do you f ind to be a t t r i b u t a b l e t o : ? 
PLAINTIFF: 50 % 
DEFENDANT: £ ft % 
TOTAL: 100% 
DATED t h i s | day of June, 1986. 
^ U ~ * --YV\ <^fc^ 
F O R E M A N T 
uob 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Defendant has the burden of proof on the following 
issues: 
1) That plaintiff was negligent or assumed the 
risk of injury; and 
2) that plaintiff's act was a proximate cause of 
plaintiff's injuries and damages. 
If you find that both parties were negligent, it will 
then be your responsibility to compare the respective negligence 
of plaintiff and defendant in percentages in accordance with 
these instructions. 
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INSTRUCTION NO* >T 
Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and 
prudent person would have done in the circumstances/ or doing 
what such person under such circumstances would not have done. 
The fault may lie in acting or omitting to act. 
The person whose conduct we set up as a standard is not 
the extraordinarily cautious individual/ nor the exceptionally 
skillful onef but a person of reasonable and ordinary prudence 
only. While exceptional caution and skill are to be admired and 
encouraged/ the law does not demand them as a general standard of 
conduct. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. v '' 
You are instructed that in any injury case the total 
negligence of the plaintiff or defendant or both in causing or 
contributing to the plaintiff's injury may only total 100%. 
This means that a plaintiff may be 100% responsible for causing 
his own injuries; a defendant may be 100% responsible for 
causing the plaintiff's injuries or each may bear a percentage 
of responsibility for causing the plaintiff's injury, which 
combined may total no more than 100% 
Therefore, if you find the defendant negligent in 
causing plaintiff's injuries then you shall assign a percentage 
to that portion of responsibility for the injuries falling on 
the defendant and to that portion of the responsbility for 
plaintiff's injuries falling on the plaintiff, if any, again 
totalling 100%. 
In connection with any apportionment of negligence, you 
are instructed that an injured person cannot recover from a 
defendant who is claimed to be negligent unless the negligence 
of the injured person is less than the negligence of the 
defendant; for example: 
appendix y 
Plaintiff 50% negligent 
Defendant 50% negligent 
Plaintiff 49% negligent 
Defendant 51% negligent 
Plaintiff 25% negligent 
Defendant 75% negligent 
no recovery 
Plaintiff recovers 51% 
of damages 
Plaintiff recovers 75% 
of damages 
However, you are to fill out the special verdict form 
section concerning the damages without regard to your assessment 
of the percentages of neglect. Any reduction in the damages is 
a function for the Court based upon your assessment of 
percentages of neglect and your assessment of the total damages 
without reduction as placed in the appropriate places on the 
special verdict form . 
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